



Prebisch lives in Asia!
Alice H. Amsden
Prebisch "lives" in Asia because leading Asian governments still
actively promote import substitution of high-tech parts and
components. But they use promotional measures other than tariff
protection to do so. Given performance standards,  they have been
highly successful. Now Latin America is behind Asian latecomers
because it missed becoming a player in the  information technology
revolution. But Latin America can still learn from Asia rather than the
Washington Consensus about how nationally owned enterprises can
build mature high-tech industries in fields other than electronics.
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Raúl Prebisch became associated in the 1950s with
Latin America’s controversial policies of import sub-
stitution and anti-export growth.1 Despite the rise of
basic industry that resulted from that strategy, import
substitution was disparaged for its inefficiency and
balance-of-payments problems in the mid-1980s, if
not earlier. The policies and institutions that had sup-
ported it were dismantled amidst a global wave of lib-
eralization, and Latin America’s markets were opened
to exports from overseas and still greater investments
from multinational firms.
Ironically, as Latin America was obliterating its
past, Asia was reinventing import substitution for
high-tech industries, and was growing faster than
Latin America under a liberal regime. A high propor-
tion of the value of many electronics devices (such as
notebooks and cell phones) was initially imported.
Government policy was oriented towards import sub-
stituting the parts and components that made up these
products as a way to create high-paid domestic jobs
and globally competitive nationally owned enterpris-
es. The import substitution policies to promote high-
tech production in China, India, Korea and Taiwan
(hereafter referred to as Asia) were less distortionary
than those used to promote mid-tech industry, insofar
as they did not involve high tariff protection.
Nevertheless, the Asian State began to play an
extremely activist role in jump-starting the high-tech
sector: a role with which Raúl Prebisch would have
been familiar. In China, India, Korea and Taiwan, the
governments were involved in the smallest details,
such as cherry-picking specific companies for subsi-
dies (in the form of residence in a science park, for
example) and spinning off parts of government labs to
create new firms. 
Asia’s promotion of science and technology and
regional development deviated from the free market
ethos of the Washington Consensus, but such inter-
ventionist measures were legal under the World Trade
Organization (WTO). WTO members may still pro-
mote science and technology at the company level,
much as the United States does through its Department
of Defense (a staunch supporter of the computer
industry) and its National Institute of Health (a cham-
pion of bio-tech). WTO members may also promote
regional development (by offering subsidies to com-
panies that locate in underdeveloped areas), as coun-
tries with North-South income inequalities tend to do
in the European Union.
The first part of this paper is designed to convey
the sheer extent of government intervention in high-
tech industry, using Taiwan as an example.2 This dis-
cussion should be of interest to economists who are
considering how to develop the anaemic high-tech
industries of Argentina, Brazil (somewhat less
anaemic), Chile and Mexico.3
The last section of the paper speculates on why
Latin America’s high-tech industries have stalled and
what would be necessary to get an Asian-type
approach up and running. The emphasis is on national
rather than foreign ownership.
 This study was prepared originally for the seminar
"Development theory at the threshold of the twenty-first century",
organized by ECLAC in Santiago, Chile, to mark the centenary of
the birth of Raúl Prebisch. 
1 The latter charge is unfair. As early as 1968, Prebisch strongly
advised the Argentine government to combine import substitution
with export activity (Mallon and Sourrouille, 1975).
2 This section is based on Amsden and Chu (2003).
3 Hereinafter, the term “Latin America” will be used to refer to
these four countries.
II
National ownership and the high-tech industry
The emergence of high-tech industries in countries of
relatively recent industrialization (“latecomers”)
—even the mature high-tech industries that constitute
most latecomers’ high-tech sector— requires entrepre-
neurship insofar as it entails the creation of the experi-
enced human resources on which those industries
depend. There is a great risk that such resources will
exit from the firm that created them. Thus, either skill
formation must initially be undertaken by the govern-
ment, with the objective of diffusing capabilities to the
private sector, or private firms must be entrepreneurial
enough to grow and diversify sufficiently to retain the
resources in which they invested. 
As late as 2000, the high-tech sector in latecomer
countries entailed mature products; Korea and Taiwan,
for example, began to produce notebooks and cell
phones only after such products had been produced in
large volume in high-wage countries. Product maturi-
ty implies a relatively low gross margin that is rapidly
falling over time. To reap profits in such an industry, a
firm must enter quickly before profitability falls fur-
ther, and it must produce at a high volume to overcome
thin margins. Ramping up fast and adapting products
in order to be quick to market involves risk-taking and
entrepreneurship, since it requires investing in the cre-
ation of a new set of skills, coordinating their forma-
tion, raising the funds to finance this, and implement-
ing and monitoring the whole process (Amsden 
and Chu, 2003).
The requisite skills may be cultivated by either
State-owned or privately owned organizations, but
nationally owned firms have a greater incentive than
foreign-owned organizations to take the lead. National
firms enjoy lower opportunity costs, more local
knowledge and a higher probability of using the same
sunk assets in a related local industry than do their for-
eign counterparts. The first entrants into a high-tech
industry in latecomer countries are therefore likely to
be nationally owned (State or private) entities.
Multinational companies may once have played a
formative role in developing labour-intensive, export-
oriented industries in latecomers, and they may enter
into high-tech industries and accelerate an existing
growth momentum.4 However, it may be assumed as a
hypothesis that the pioneers of high-tech industry in
latecomer countries will be nationally owned firms
with either direct or indirect experience in mid-tech
sectors or in another type of economic activity, such as
marketing foreign products (Amsden and Hikino,
1994).
Table 1 shows the share of high-tech industry in
manufacturing value added in selected Latin American
and Asian economies for the years 1980 and 1995 (the
last year for which comparable data are available). The
higher share of high-tech in China, India, Korea and
Taiwan compared with Argentina, Chile and Mexico is
striking. Only Brazil compares with the Asian coun-
tries in the extent to which its manufacturing sector is
dominated by high-tech.
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4 On the sequential timing of foreign direct investment, see
Amsden (2001).
These differences can be attributed to the owner-
ship of the firms and to government initiative. In turn,
the importance of national versus foreign ownership
and the activism of the State have deep historical roots
involving the nature of prewar manufacturing experi-
ence and technology transfer (Amsden, 2001).5 Two
major types of transfer may be distinguished: emigré
and colonial. National ownership and government ini-
tiatives to promote high-tech sectors tend to be greater
in countries with colonial —rather than emigré— pre-
war manufacturing experience.6
In the emigré form of experience, technological
capabilities and business organizations were trans-
ferred by means of foreign individuals (and later com-
panies) that located operations in a latecomer setting.
Like the North Americans and Europeans in Latin
America and the Chinese in Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia
and Thailand), such emigrés are a major source of
modern business know-how and skill formation. The
boundaries between national ownership and foreign
ownership become blurred, and government policy
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5 This paper does not discuss the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Thailand, whose manufacturing sectors are relatively young com-
pared with the four Latin American and four Asian countries dis-
cussed. Malaysia’s share of high-tech industry is high in terms of
manufacturing value added owing to labour-intensive electronics
assembly, which is not high-tech in terms of skill content. For a
more detailed discussion, see Amsden (2001). Nevertheless, both
Thailand and Malaysia have begun to invest heavily in R&D.
Investments in technology in Indonesia were never negligible. Over
25 years ago, Indonesia sent a large contingent of engineers to the
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in order to build its aerospace industry.
TABLE  1
Percentage of manufacturing value added in high-tech industries, 1980 and 1995
(Percentages)
1995 Argentina Brazil Chile China India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico
Other chemical products 3.5 10.1 8.0 1.9 7.9 3.6 4.7 2.2 7.2
Non-electrical machinery 3.1 7.5 1.8 11.1 8.3 1.0 8.4 5.0 3.3
Electrical machinery 3.0 8.0 1.5 9.9 8.4 3.1 14.4 27.4 3.2
Transport equipment 7.4 10.4 2.0 6.3 8.5 8.9 10.7 4.7 10.1
Professional and scientific  goods 0.4 0.8 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.8 1.2 1.7
Total 17.4 36.8 13.3 30.2 33.7 16.6 39.1 40.5 25.6
Taiwan Thailand Turkey Rest Japan France UK US
(average)
Other chemical products 2.7 2.5 4.7 4.9 5.8 6.1 7.0 6.8
Non-electrical machinery 5.2 3.3 4.5 5.2 12.1 7.0 11.3 10.5
Electrical machinery 17.3 5.5 6.0 9.0 14.7 10.0 8.4 9.6
Transport equipment 7.4 5.2 6.7 7.4 10.6 10.9 10.4 11.6
Professional and scientific goods 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 5.8
Total 33.6 17.3 22.3 27.2 44.4 35.6 38.8 44.3
1980 Argentina Brazil Chile China India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico
Other chemical products 4.9 4.9 6.5 3.3 8.1 7.1 5.2 3.2 5.2
Non-electrical machinery 5.5 10.0 1.9 15.1 8.6 1.6 3.4 3.2 4.8
Electrical machinery 3.7 6.3 1.8 3.6 8.1 5.3 8.1 12.3 4.4
Transport equipment 9.3 7.8 2.5 3.4 8.3 6.4 5.9 4.2 6.9
Professional and scientific goods 0.4 0.6 0.1 9.2 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.7
Total 23.8 29.8 12.9 34.6 33.9 20.4 23.8 23.6 22.1
Taiwan Thailand Turkey Rest Japan France UK US
(average)
Other chemical products 1.0 2.7 3.6 4.7 4.6 3.9 4.6 4.6
Non-electrical machinery 1.9 1.9 4.7 5.2 11.6 10.1 13.0 13.3
Electrical machinery 7.0 3.8 4.3 5.7 11.5 8.9 9.3 9.7
Transport equipment 2.5 3.7 5.0 5.5 9.5 11.0 10.7 10.6
Professional and scientific  goods 0.9 0.3 0.1 1.2 1.7 1.4 1.3 3.6
Total 13.4 12.4 17.6 22.3 38.7 35.2 38.9 41.9
Source: Amsden (2001).
6 The measurement of national versus foreign ownership across
countries in any particular industry, or in the manufacturing sector
at large, is vexed by different definitions of “foreign” — the per-
centage of equity in an investment that is foreign owned. The avail-
able cross-country data, however, suggest that foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) is much more important in the manufacturing industries
of Latin America than in Asia (as defined above): see Amsden
(2001).
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towards promoting national ownership over foreign
ownership is at best ambivalent. In identity politics, it
is unclear who is a foreigner and who is a national.
In the colonial type of prewar manufacturing
experience, business know-how and foreign skills
were transferred by firms that resided in the home
country of the colonial ruler. For example, the major
nationality of foreign firms in India was British, while
in Korea and Taiwan, it was Japanese. This form of
technology transfer was favourable to national owner-
ship because colonialism eventually ended in decolo-
nization, which had many positive impacts on coun-
tries that had succeeded in acquiring prewar manufac-
turing experience. Foreign political rule was displaced
by national political rule, and colonial firms typically
were taken over by nationals. In Indonesia, roughly
400 Dutch-owned companies were left behind
—albeit practically gutted— when Dutch domination
ended (Lindblad, 1996). In India, British enterprise
either sold out to Indian buyers or could not compete
against them (Tomlinson, 1981). In Korea and Taiwan,
Japanese manufacturing enterprise and banks fell into
the hands of national governments (Amsden, 1989;
Fields, 1995). In China, foreign-owned firms were
appropriated after the Chinese Communist revolution.
Decolonization thus cleared the way for nationally
owned companies to grow, whereas emigrés tended to
crowd out nationally owned firms in industries subject
to economies of scale.7 In turn, nationally owned
firms, especially those originating in mid-tech indus-
try, often became the entrepreneurs behind the rise of
high-tech industries and services such as the computer
industry, telecommunications, finance and high-speed
trains, as in the cases of Korea and Taiwan.8
Decolonization also created a culture of national-
ism, which gave rise to political demands for land
reform and government policies to promote nationally
owned firms and the high-tech industry. Economic
nationalism took many forms, but all shared the objec-
tives of creating an alternative to multinational enter-
prise and generating the wherewithal to move up the
ladder of comparative advantage, beyond labor-inten-
sive or raw-material-intensive industries. This
required, first, government-owned national research
and development (R&D) laboratories, such as the
defence-related labs in China and India, which became
breeding grounds for private high-tech industries, and
second, investments in tertiary education, which tend-
ed to be high in Asia.
Finally, nationalism tended to foster an ethos of
equality, which was patently absent under colonial
rule. All four Asian countries discussed above intro-
duced land reform in varying degrees of radicalism,
with the most radical in China and the least in India.
Land reform abolished the large estates that had
earned Ricardian rents (that is, above normal profits)
in prewar years. With such profit-making opportuni-
ties gone, the opportunity costs of investing in manu-
facturing industries were lowered, making manufac-
turing a more attractive financial venture than it had
been when consolidated holdings of land and mining
rights characterized the agricultural sector, broadly
defined. The reduction of opportunity costs outside
manufacturing also made it less costly for the govern-
ment to subsidize manufacturing activity in order to
lure capital and human resources out of agriculture
and into new import-substitution manufacturing indus-
tries (Amsden, 2001).
The degree of high-tech activity, measured in
table 1 as the share of high-tech industry in total man-
ufacturing value added, therefore tends to be higher in
Asia than in Latin America. The exception is Brazil,
where the State launched a highly nationalistic project
to develop local capabilities to manufacture mini-com-
puters. This project was generally unsuccessful, in part
because of weaknesses in tertiary education and lack
of experience among nationally owned firms, which
were stronger in the realm of finance than manufac-
turing (Evans, 1995; Sridharan, 1996).
The difference in high-tech development in Latin
America and Asia can thus be attributed to history,
specifically to whether prewar manufacturing experi-
ence was acquired through emigration or colonialism.
The question now becomes how and why to pro-
mote high-tech industry in emigré-dominated
economies. But first the paper examines the case of
Taiwan, where both the emigrés (from the Shanghai
region of China) and decolonization were critical in
moving beyond late development, based on mid-tech-
nology industries.
7 For the Argentine automobile industry, see Cochran and Reina
(1962).
8 On Taiwan, see Amsden and Chu (2003).
III
Government leadership in high-tech in Taiwan
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The Taiwanese government’s role in promoting high-
tech was major insofar as it was meant to create the
new market segments in which national companies
could then compete. Its strategy featured import sub-
stitution and the germination of parts suppliers around
a lead firm, or “second mover” (the first latecomer
firm to enter a mature high-tech industry). Whereas
the government had spawned new industries in the old
economy using State-owned enterprises and import-
substituting policy tools such as tariff protection, local
content regulations and development banking, it did so
in the new economy using spin-offs from State-owned
research institutes and science parks, together with
import-substituting policy tools such as subsidies to
public and private R&D, tax breaks and financially
favourable conditions for residents of science parks. 
By 2000, there were more than 15,000 profes-
sionals in Taiwan who had at one time or another
worked for ITRI, the government’s premier research
center devoted to high-tech industry.9 Of these 15,000
professionals, more than 12,000 had, in fact, gone to
work in such industry. Of these 12,000, 5,000 had
been employed in Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial
Park.10 ITRI was also responsible for spinning off the
two pillars of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, the
United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) and the
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
(TSMC). 
The government sought to break technological
bottlenecks to enable nationally owned second movers
to compete globally in “new” high-tech subindustries,
and then to pass on their know-how to local parts sup-
pliers. By the 1970s, the fast growth of labour-inten-
sive exports had depleted Taiwan’s “unlimited” labour
reserves, and major projects in heavy industry were
already in place. It was thus strongly believed that the
next set of growth opportunities had to be created in
high-tech industry, and that the government had to
play a major role in cultivating them. “To many poli-
cy makers in Taiwan, the classical price-mechanism
type of resource allocation was simply too slow a
process to promote industrial development. They
advocated that more direct industrial policy measures
be considered to speed up development of high-tech
industry” (San, 1995, p. 35). 
The government promoted high-tech industry on
several fronts, including fiscal policy, the creation of
science parks, and the pro-active investments of pub-
lic R&D institutes, some of which assumed multiple
roles. ITRI, for example, undertook key technology
projects to give a head start to pivotal industries, such
as semiconductors and personal computers (PCs). Its
spin-offs thus became Taiwan’s leading firms in inte-
grated circuit design. ITRI also actively initiated proj-
ects to explore major areas in which it believed the pri-
vate sector might profitably invest next. After an
industry got started, ITRI would undertake smaller-
scale projects to substitute for the importation of key
components. The government’s objective was always
to create local growth opportunities and local value
added, besides upgrading the level of local technology.
All forms of promotion converged in industries judged
to be strategic in terms of their technology intensity,
value added, market potential, industrial linkages,
energy consumption and pollution content. 
The government passed the “Development of
Critical Components and Products Act” in 1992 to
select 66 inputs for import substitution in an effort to
reduce a persistent trade deficit with Japan.11 Despite
a bias in favour of imports on the part of domestic
users of high-tech components, scarcities of such com-
ponents promised high prices and high profits for
firms that could make them instead of importing them.
Users of such inputs had an added incentive to make
them in-house in order to stabilize their supply. For its
11 Taiwan’s annual trade deficit with Japan grew in US dollars to
about ten billion in 1991 from only two billion or three billion in the
first half of the 1980s. Japan was the only trading partner against
which Taiwan persistently ran a large trade deficit. Nevertheless, the
share of Taiwan’s imports from Japan out of total imports was rela-
tively stable in this period; it remained at around 30%. Import
dependence on Japan was thus probably a better indicator of
Taiwan’s technological dependence than its trade imbalance.
Arguably, therefore, the passage of the “Development of Critical
Components and Products Act” had less to do with trade structure
than with industrial upgrading.
9 ITRI is the Industrial Technology Research Institute.
10 The ITRI (2001) and Industrial Technology Information Service
(ITIS) reports are available at
http://www.itri.org.tw/eng/about/annual/annual98/spec_pg3.jsp
part, the government became committed to the substi-
tution of imports of high-tech components to prevent
hollowing out, or the movement of manufacturing jobs
overseas. 
Government leadership in strengthening science
and technology (S&T) is illustrated below using the
examples of compact disk-read-only memory devices
(CD-ROMs), liquid crystal displays (LCDs) and inte-
grated circuit (IC) design. Key government pro-
grammes are then briefly reviewed. 
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12 Information on CD-ROMs is derived from the following sources:
Industrial Development Bureau (various years), ITRI (1997), ERSO
(1994), Hsiao (1994) and Market Intelligence Center (various, no.
2267).
1. CD-ROMs
The CD-ROM, an optical storage device,12 was cho-
sen by the Taiwan government as a target industry in
1992 after extended discussion among government
officials, academics and leading business people.
Several related key technologies, such as the optical
pick-up head, were also identified for promotion.
The Department of Industrial Technology (DoIT) in
the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) handled
the so-called supply side: it invited research insti-
tutes, mainly ITRI, to submit R&D proposals to
develop the selected items. Resources came from the
Science and Technology R&D fund in four consecu-
tive years, from 1993 to 1996. By the end of 1996,
the total budget was roughly US$10 million. 
The Industrial Development Board of the
MOEA handled the so-called demand side by invit-
ing private companies (based on specified criteria)
to participate in the development process. The pro-
grammes involved were the “Regulations Governing
the Development of New Industrial Products by
Private Enterprises” and the “Regulations
Governing Assistance in the Development of
Leading Products.” These two programmes provided
R&D grants to private enterprises to engage in new
product development. The grants were to be repaid if
and when sales actually materialized. 
The CD-ROM project involved 25 firms in joint
development and technology transfer.13 Four patents
were derived for CD-ROMs and 24 for CD-ROM
pick-up heads. Ramp-up was astonishingly fast. As
indicated in table 2, Taiwan’s share of CD-ROMs in
world output rose from 1% in 1994 (218,000 units)
to 50% only five years later (48,690,000 units). 
TABLE 2
CD-ROM production, 1991-1999a
Output, B/A ITRI cooperation
Year thousands of units
A. World B. Taiwan % (number of firms)
1991 936 1
1992 1 050 7
1993 6 740 25
1994 17 966 218 1 25
1995 38 572 3 600 9 25
1996 51 000 9 170 18 25
1997 61 000 16 000 26
1998 89 300 30 780 35
1999 96 860 48 690 50
Source: ITRI (1997) and Market Intelligence Center (various years).
a CD-ROM = compact disk read-only memory.
IV
Import substitution cum high-tech promotion
13 Interviewed firms include BTC, Inventec, Acer, U-Max, and
Lite-On. BTC and Lite-On were also involved in the project to
develop the CD-ROM pick-up head.
Although the firms that acquired CD-ROM tech-
nology from ITRI were able to begin assembly opera-
tions at once, and although the CD-ROM at the time
was already a mature product, technological change
continued to be rapid. As shown in table 3, manufac-
turers had to upgrade their know-how repeatedly to
produce faster CD-ROMs. Moreover, they had to
import key components from Japan. Local production
of disks and spindles gradually came on line, but the
two most critical inputs, the optical pick-up head and
the ASIC set, were still being imported after 1996,
although ITRI was in the process of developing them.
Taiwanese firms moved ahead of Japan as the
major producers of CD-ROMs, but Japanese compa-
nies were shifting to other new and improved models,
such as the DVD-ROM and the CD-RW. Most
Taiwanese firms were reluctant to enter into DVD-
ROM production because they considered the royalty
fees demanded by Japanese companies prohibitive,
but then ITRI transferred DVD-ROM technology to
13 firms in 1997. Around 2000 the price of the DVD-
ROM was twice that of the CD-ROM, but replacement
of one with the other was expected to be slow. 
2. Liquid crystal displays (TFT-LCDs)
Liquid crystal displays14 were pioneered in the late
1970s and 1980s by Japanese firms, first in their simpler
forms (twisted nematic, or TN, and supertwisted nemat-
ic, or STN) and then in their more complex form (thin
film transistor, or TFT).15 The latter represented a great
challenge to manufacturers owing to their extremely
high financial and processing requirements.
Profitability depended on low defect rates and high
yields. 
By the mid-1990s, some Korean chaebols (such
as Samsung, Hyundai and LG), in collaboration with
the ministries responsible for promoting technological
innovation, had succeeded in entering the TFT-LCD
industry and providing a modest challenge to Japanese
hegemony. Some Taiwanese firms were competitively
producing TN- and STN-LCDs by the early 1990s, but
they hesitated to enter the more capital-intensive TFT-
LCD market. 
Two events probably pushed them into action.
Prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Samsung,
Hyundai and LG had planned large expansions to
catch up with Japanese manufacturers, but the crisis
led them to mothball their plans. At the same time,
Japanese business groups that were suffering from
prolonged recession and overcapacity became unable
or unwilling to continue making the huge investments
in TFT-LCDs necessary to keep up with the competi-
tion. A few, therefore, decided to cooperate with
Taiwanese firms by granting them technology licenses
and giving them OEM orders.16 Suddenly, therefore,
leading Taiwanese firms announced plans to obtain
technology from Japanese partners and make big
investments to produce TFT-LCDs. 
The entry of Taiwanese firms changed the global
distribution of large TFT-LCD capacity. Taiwan’s
share of global capacity increased from zero percent in
1998, to 2% in 1999, 15% in 2000, and 26% in the first
quarter of 2001. With these huge increases in capacity,
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16 A joint venture between IBM and Toshiba formed in 1989 ceased
making LCDs for computers in May 2001. Toshiba will use its
Japan facility to make LCDs for cell phones, and IBM will use it for
ultra-high-resolution applications such as medical devices (Nikkei
Weekly, 2001).
14 Information on the liquid crystal display (LCD) industry is from
Wong and Matthews (1998), Linden and others (1998) and ITRI
(1999 and 2000b).
15 An LCD is the best-known example of the type of microelec-
tronic flat panel display which is used in electronic calculators, lap-
top computers and other applications.
TABLE 3
Technological upgrading in the CD-ROM industry, 1994-1999
(Percentage of total output)
Year CD-ROM read peed
2 4 6 8 10-12 16 20 24 32 36 40 44-48 >50 Total
1994 100 100
1995 40 47 13 100
1996 13 67 20 100
1997a 23 22 55 100
1998b 2 11 27 60 100
1999b 6 31 47 16 100
Source: Market Intelligence Center (various years).
a = second half;  b = fourth quarter.
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the international price of TFT-LCDs fell sharply, and
the price of a 14.1-inch TFT notebook panel dropped
from US$1100 in the third quarter of 1997 to a little
over US$600 in the fourth quarter of 2000. With large
investments and falling prices, mergers and acquisi-
tions came onto the agenda of the firms in this sector. 
ITRI had initiated an R&D project on TFT-LCDs
in 1988, but no Taiwanese firm relied on ITRI’s tech-
nology when the time came to invest in TFT-LCD
capacity. In this respect, ITRI’s efforts were a failure.
Nevertheless, the competitiveness of the high-tech
groups that entered into TFT-LCD production in
Taiwan depended on further technological develop-
ment, and it was expected that ITRI would play a lead-
ing role at this higher stage. Indeed, it established
Taiwan’s first low-temperature polysilicone (LTPS)
TFT-LCD laboratory in 2000 and has developed some
key components for more advanced types of 
panel display. 
3. Integrated circuit (IC) design
The basis of a networked semiconductor industry
stemmed from the Taiwanese government’s creation of
two world-class semiconductor manufacturers: United
Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) in 1980, which is
still government-owned, and the larger Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in
1987. Both were spin-offs from experimental IC facto-
ries set up by the government-owned Electronics
Research and Service Organization (ERSO), although
they emerged at different stages and from different
projects17 TSMC was also a “foundry” that specialized
only in wafer production, eschewing investment in
auxiliary operations, unlike the vertically integrated
device manufacturers (IDMs) that dominated the semi-
conductor industry worldwide.18 The specialization
strategy was the outcome of a deliberate government
decision influenced by a prominent State official, K.T.
Li, and Morris Chang, who came to Taiwan at the gov-
ernment’s invitation in 1985 to head ITRI and later
TSMC.19 Chang was a former senior vice president at
Texas Instruments and had been the highest ranking
Chinese-American in the United States high-tech
industry.
Three IC design companies (Quasel, Mosel and
Vitelic) were established in Taiwan with government
support by returnees (Taiwanese living abroad who
return to live and work in Taiwan) from the United
States. In 1985, all three were in financial trouble, and
they again requested government help.20 They wanted
a local specialized foundry that could provide them
with much faster and better service than large-scale for-
eign integrated device manufacturers, who regarded
their orders as peripheral to their main business. The
intellectual property of a design was also better pro-
tected by a foundry than an IDM. 
Taiwan’s IC design industry leapt from eight
houses in 1985 to fifty houses in 1988. Sales grew
175% in 1988 and 143% in 1989. This was “partly due
to the growth of the domestic market and partly due to
the establishment of TSMC”.21 In 1999, 91% of the
fabrication work demanded by Taiwan’s IC design
houses was done locally. The top seven IC design hous-
es are estimated to have accounted for 60% to 70% of
total IC design revenue. In the same year, 62% of semi-
conductor output was sold locally.22
Taiwan’s IC design companies benefited from
local supporting industries other than foundries. The IC
mask industry, like the foundry industry, was set up by
the government. ERSO transferred mask technology
from two American companies —IMR in 1977 and
Electromask in 1980— and began providing commer-
cial masking services to local IC producers. The
responsible division was then spun off as the Taiwan
Mask Corporation in 1989.23 Having a domestic mask-
ing service is estimated to have saved local firms 20
days or more in the complete IC production cycle 
(Lin, 1987). 
Some United States electronics firms had moved
into southern Taiwan’s export processing zone in the
1960s to do packaging, testing and assembly (such as
17 ERSO is part of ITRI. 
18 The stages involved in the production of an integrated circuit are
design, manufacturing, masking (or sealing), packaging and testing.
19 UMC ultimately adopted TSMC’s strategy and became less ver-
tically integrated, assuming the structure of a foundry.
20 ERSO started a multi-project chip programme with the National
Science Council in 1983 to help build up IC design capabilities in
Taiwan’s universities (Chen and Sewell, 1996). Mosel and Vitelic
merged in December 1991 and now manufacture and market world-
wide dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips and other
products. Revenues were US$880 million in 2000. Quasel is no
longer in business.
21 Market Intelligence Center (1989, p. 390); see also Lin (1987)
and Chiang and Tsai (2000). 
22 Ministry of Finance website (www.mof.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-web-
site/5-gp/eu/tables.htm). 
23 See ERSO, 1994.
General Instrument, Motorola, Microchip and Texas
Instruments). These industries were gradually local-
ized; both Motorola and Microchip, for example, sold
their packaging capacity to nationally owned firms in
1999. In that year Taiwan’s packaging capacity ranked
first in the world: 99% of domestic packaging demand
was supplied locally, and local packagers got half their
business from domestic firms (ITRI, 2000a). 
The human resources involved in the IC design
industry, like the IC industry as a whole, came largely
from ERSO and other government institutions or pro-
grammes and, to a lesser extent, from abroad. Most of
the early IC design houses, such as Syntek (1982),
Holtek (1983), and PTD (1986) were either ERSO
spin-offs or were set up by former ERSO staff. These
firms, in turn, had unintended spin-offs of their own,
such as Chip Design Technology (1985) and Tontek
(1986), which spun off from Syntek. When foreign
design firms, such as Motorola and Philips, set up IC
design facilities in Taiwan in the late 1980s, they either
recruited from ERSO or asked ERSO to conduct their
training courses (Lin, 1987). Returnees became impor-
tant only in the 1990s. Of the top ten IC design houses
in Taiwan, it is estimated that two were run by
returnees in 1989, but that number had increased to five
by 1995 (Hsu, 1997).
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V
Start-ups: firm-level targeting
Taiwan was one of the first latecomer countries in
which venture capitalism flourished, playing a major
role in supporting Taiwan’s high-tech industry.24 The
government was the catalyst: it began promoting pri-
vate venture capital funds to finance start-ups in 1983,
and it also founded its own venture capital firm around
the same time.25
Nevertheless, venture capitalism cannot be credit-
ed with Taiwan’s large (although steeply declining)
number of start-ups. According to venture capital data
for 1995-2000, start-ups received only a minor share of
funds. Of the five stages of a firm’s life cycle (seeding,
start-up, ramp-up, maturity and restructuring), start-up
received only 13.3% of total venture capital funding in
1995.26 Assuming the available data are accurate, the
lion’s share of funding went to ramp-up and maturity
(the former included the transformation of privately
held companies into publicly held companies through
initial public offerings, or IPOs)27 By 2000, the share of
total venture capital allocated to start-ups had risen to
32.8%, but this was still below the share allotted to
expansion and maturity.
In cases in which an outside agent incubated a
start-up, that agent was typically the government rather
than a private venture capitalist. The government
sometimes nurtured a start-up directly, as in its found-
ing of Taiwan’s two world-class State-owned semicon-
ductor foundries, UMC and TSMC. Usually, however,
the government nurtured start-ups indirectly by provid-
ing them with the finance, facilities and access to bot-
tleneck technologies that were necessary for them to
grow. 
A major form of incubation in Taiwan was the sci-
ence park, with the first located south of Taipei in
24 “Seventy percent of VC [venture capital] investments have been
in computer-related and electronics sectors. The rest occurs in com-
munications, industrial products, and medical/biotechnology. The
concentration by Taiwan’s VC on technological rather than tradi-
tional industries, which is similar to the case of Singapore and South
Korea, can be explained by the tax incentives which channel VC
towards technological enterprise investments” (Wang, 1995, p. 86).
25 In 1983 the Ministry of Finance introduced a statute
(“Regulations Governing Venture Capital Investment Enterprises”)
that laid down guidelines for the organization of venture capital
firms, their minimum capital requirements, and rules for the man-
agement and supervision of their funds. The first venture capital
company to be created was Multiventure Capital Corp. (1984), a
joint venture between Acer and Continental Construction. A second
joint venture was founded in 1986 between an American venture
capital firm (Hambrest & Quest) and various government agencies,
in which 49% of the firms’ minimum capital requirements came
from the government’s development fund (the Executive Yuan) and
a quasi-development bank (Chiao-Tung). See Tzeng (1991) and
Taiwan Venture Capital Association (www.tvca.org.tw/indexe.htm).
26 The funding of start-ups by the venture capital industry may have
been more important in the 1980s than in the 1990s. It has been esti-
mated that of the 80 firms operating in Hsinchu Science Park in
1987, as many as 43 were financed by venture capitalists (Liu and
others, 1989).
27 “The achievements of VCs in directing technological enterprises
about how to go public with their stock are considerable” (Wang, 
1995, p. 90). Public offerings were the major exit strategy of ven-
ture capital investors.
85C E P A L R E V I E W  8 2 • A P R I L 2 0 0 4
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES: PREBISCH LIVES IN ASIA! •  ALICE H. AMSDEN
VI
Performance standards
Thus, despite the government’s lip-service to liberal-
ization and despite its opening of markets to greater
foreign competition, industrial policy continued to play
an important role in Taiwan’s high-tech industries. The
general success of industrial policy (as measured by
global market share in information technology)
stemmed from the maturity of the technology Taiwan
was acquiring and to the performance standards
observed. 
The high-tech products that Taiwan targeted for
import substitution were already mature by world stan-
dards, in that sales had already reached a high level
before the products were manufactured in Taiwan.
Thus, the government’s targeting was not a shot in the
dark: national enterprises had to face economic uncer-
tainty, but they were not also confronting the techno-
logical unknown. Still, the potential margin of error on
the government’s part was large because technological
uncertainty was not necessarily trivial even among
mature products. For example, the government made
the right choice, among several possibilities, in the case
of information technology. Its “decision to bet on
CMOS proved critical for Taiwan’s ability to synchro-
nize the development of semiconductor technology and
its PC-based information technology so as to achieve a
high synergy effect” (Chang and Tsai, 2000, p. 187)29
The government’s choices were based on careful and
concerted studies of technological developments and
trends by committees of government, business and uni-
versity experts. In addition, the allocation of subsidies
generally succeeded because, as in the past, the gov-
ernment tied the support to concrete, measurable and
monitorable performance standards.30 What was differ-
ent in the high-tech stage of upgrading was that these
standards tended to emphasize investment in assets that
were knowledge-based.
Performance standards functioned in Taiwan’s
high-tech industries on two dimensions: as criteria
that firms had to meet to be eligible for government
subsidies, and as a condition for continuing to
receive the incentives granted. The government had
to be selective because the demand for subsidies by
firms and research institutes exceeded supply.
Conditionality itself worked because Taiwan’s man-
ufacturing sector —as evidenced by interviews with
firms— had accumulated enough experience and
skills to potentially produce high-tech products prof-
itably. As projects became profitable, they generated
the revenue for beneficiaries to repay their loans and
to meet government R&D requirements — the pro-
gramme’s cardinal condition. Successful projects, in
turn, reinforced the government’s commitment to
promotion.
Hsinchu and the second in Tainan in southern Taiwan.
Start-ups were cherry-picked by the government for
residence in these parks. Park residents received a set
of comprehensive and generous subsidies that includ-
ed tax and import duty exemptions, grants and subsi-
dized credit, below-market rents for high-quality fac-
tory buildings or sites, living amenities for high-cali-
bre researchers (including bilingual language instruc-
tion for expatriates’ children), and access to govern-
ment and university research facilities. “The engine of
economic growth in the 1980s in Taiwan [was] the
information industry, while the science-based industri-
al park [was] the driver of that engine” (Liu and oth-
ers, 1989, p. 35).28 Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial
Park accounted for a large and increasing share of
Taiwan’s total R&D spending —as much as 18% in
1998— although it accounted for less than 1% of total
output (sales as a share of gross national product).
Finally, while the number of Ph.D.s in Taiwan grew
from 6,000 in 1990 to roughly 16,000 in 1998, the
share employed by firms in Hsinchu Science-Based
Industrial Park rose just as sharply, from 2% to over
6% in the same period.
28 See also Chang (1992), Yang (1998) and Hsinchu Science-Based
Industrial Park (2000), publication no. 2309.
29 CMOS stands for complementary metal-oxide semiconductor.
For more about this decision, see Chang and others (1994).
30 For a general discussion of performance standards in the success
of government intervention in late industrialization, see Amsden
(2001).
The conditions for admission into Hsinchu
Science-Based Industrial Park (circa 1980) were as
follows:
i) A firm had to have the ability to design products
for manufacturing according to a business plan;
ii) It had to have produced products that had under-
gone initial R&D that was still in process;
iii) It had to have manufactured products with a
potential for development and innovation;
iv) It had to have experience in high-level innovation
and R&D in a research department that con-
formed with a minimum specified size;
v) It had to have adopted production processes that
required either training in advanced technology
or the spending of fairly large sums on R&D;
vi) It was required, within three years after market-
ing a product or service, to employ a staff with no
less than 50 % local technical personnel; and
vii) Its operations had to contribute significantly to
Taiwan’s economic reconstruction and national
defence (Liu and others, 1989).
Winners were selected by a tripartite committee
of experts drawn from private industry, government
and academic circles, as in other government pro-
grammes.
To qualify for government funds for strategic
products or industries (such as CD-ROMs or TFT-
LCDs), the following standards had to be met:
i) Firms had to demonstrate their financial sound-
ness and economic capabilities;
ii) They had to prove that they operated a research
department; and
iii) They had to demonstrate substantial past R&D
achievements.
Once a product receiving government promotion
was successfully developed, intellectual property
rights were handled as follows:
i) Ownership was shared equally, as jointly owned
property, by the Ministry of Economic Affairs
(MOEA) and the firm that had developed the
product, since the government had invested 50 %
of total development costs;
ii) If the MOEA wished to sell part of its intellectu-
al property rights, the firm that shared these rights
with the government had the right of first refusal;
and
iii) In the event that the firm failed to engage in pro-
duction or to initiate sales of the targeted leading
product within three years after the completion of
the development plan (for reasons such as bank-
ruptcy, marketing strategy or operational difficul-
ties), the firm not only lost its intellectual proper-
ty rights entirely, but also had to repay in install-
ments the money the government had invested.
To receive subsidies for R&D, firms in strategic
industries had to commit to spending a certain fraction
of their own revenues on additional R&D. The fraction
partially depended on firm size: the larger the firm, the
greater the fraction. If the amount spent was below the
prescribed ratio, then the firm had to contribute the
balance to a research and development fund designat-
ed by the government.
All told, the government pro-actively promoted
the accumulation of knowledge-based assets in strate-
gic industries to maintain Taiwan’s standing as a pro-
duction base. The performance standards it exacted for
its subsidies further promoted high value added.
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A high-tech industry is one whose technology is still
tacit rather than explicit owing to firm-specific, pro-
prietary capabilities that create novel products and
earn above-normal rents. High-tech industries are thus
desirable for a country because they require high-
wage, skilled workers and offer opportunities for
entrepreneurs to earn technological profits. By defini-
tion, the rate of return of a high-tech product is still
above normal for a latecomer even when technology is
mature by advanced-country standards.
The domination of the United States and Asia in
electronics makes it very difficult for newcomers to
enter this field. In the case of Asia, not only is the
region the low-cost manufacturer of virtually all
mature electronics products owing to well-developed
private firms and national innovation systems, but
Asian producers also benefit from national and region-
al external economies (Fujita and others, 2000).
Latin America has two possibilities to create
high-tech industry and, concomitantly, the firms and
skilled workers necessary for such industry to thrive.
First, it can “induce” foreign-owned firms that domi-
nate industries such as automobiles to do more R&D
locally. As evident from table 1, a broad definition of
high-tech includes industries that are not especially
R&D-intensive, such as transportation equipment,
alongside electronics and chemicals, for example,
which are the two most R&D-intensive industries.
Nevertheless, leading producers of automobiles, such
as Volkswagen and General Motors, have large corpo-
rate laboratories at home. They have an incentive to
transfer R&D activity to latecomers owing to lower
engineering costs. They also have a disincentive to do
so, however, given the shortage of experienced skilled
workers, uncertain property rights, and an unwilling-
ness on the part of scientists at corporate labs to relin-
quish control over the most interesting research proj-
ects. Top management wants to keep these projects at
home, under surveillance.
The Singapore government was able to overcome
these resistances on the part of foreign firms, which
accounted for about 80% of the country’s total manu-
facturing value added, by systematically and deliber-
ately creating a system of incentives and a set of insti-
tutions to make foreign firms do more local R&D
(Amsden and others, 2001). In fact, the most advanced
and promising R&D in terms of skill formation and
new product development was undertaken by govern-
ment-owned labs, acting independently. Such labs also
worked with foreign companies to help them solve
their production problems and, later, problems related
to more advanced research. In addition, the govern-
ment was scrupulous in protecting intellectual proper-
ty and in subsidizing research and training by the pri-
vate sector. This contributed to an increasing effort on
the part of foreign firms to undertake R&D in
Singapore. A similar scenario could be imagined for
Latin America.
Second, Latin America has excelled in the pro-
duction of petrochemicals. Some countries, especially
Brazil and at one time Argentina, were also good at
pharmaceuticals. These two industries, combined with
bio-tech, comprise a large sector with diverse opportu-
nities for new, high-tech products.
TABLE  4
Research and development expenditure ,
1985 & 1995














Source: All countries except Taiwan: UNESCO, various years;
Taiwan: Taiwan National Science Council, 1996.
a The data are for the following years: India and Indonesia, 1986;
Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Turkey, 1987;  Chile and Taiwan, 1988.
b The data are for the following years: Malaysia, 1992; Mexico,
1993; India and Korea, 1994.
Whatever the potential, R&D for all industries to
date accounts for a much lower share of gross nation-
al product (GNP) in Latin America than in Asia 
87C E P A L R E V I E W  8 2 • A P R I L 2 0 0 4
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES: PREBISCH LIVES IN ASIA! •  ALICE H. AMSDEN
VII
High-tech industry in Latin America
(table 4). Very few Latin American firms are active in
R&D, including firms in Brazil (Alcorta and Peres,
1998). The education system is not oriented towards
research that has industrial applications, and govern-
ment laboratories have been neglected in the liberal
spirit of cutting back public expenditures. Latin
America must therefore undertake substantial policy
making and institution building if it is to promote
high-tech industry. The problem is not the rules of the
WTO (although these generally don’t help), but rather
the inappropriate technology-related institutions that
exist as a result of the Washington Consensus. 
Institution building in favour of high-tech growth
was a major part of Taiwan’s success, as seen above in
the case of the CD-ROM, TFT-LCD and IC design
industries. These institutions, which involved a large
but disciplined role for the government, were of the
type that motivated Raúl Prebisch’s writings on eco-
nomic development. Hence, it is true to say that Raúl
Prebisch lives in Asia.
Clearly, most investments in new technology,
whether private or public, fail. If countries do not
invest in technology, however, their economies will
almost certainly fail too. Will Latin America open the
door again to neo-Prebisch policies, this time aimed at
building industries that are high tech?
(Original: English)
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